Shareholder- owned electric utility monopolies, such as SCE&G here in the Midlands and Duke in the Upstate, have to make a return for their shareholders. Otherwise, the price of a share of stock falls, and the cost of borrowing money goes up, and with it the cost of a kilowatt- hour. Therefore, the electric power business is regulated by government to protect both the investor and the consumer.

In other words, since the shareholder- owned utility monopolies are regulated in S.C. by the Public Service Commission, the shareholder is assured of a respectable return in the form of a decent dividend. Consequently, the rate payer doesn't suffer much fluctuation in the price of a kilowatt- hour. In the end, the business plan for the shareholder- owned utility monopoly includes something about not being allowed to have a losing year, ever.

In the Green Era, less use of electric power is part of the societal goal, as much as more product sales has always been part of SCE&G's and Duke's goals.

As an aside, the peculiar exception is the co- operative utility, which is not owned by shareholders but owned by the citizens of S.C. Santee Cooper and its affiliated co- ops across the state are veritable nonprofits dedicated to the delivery of electric power as cheaply as possible, plus a little bit to cover unforeseen overhead and foreseen future power plant construction and accompanying infrastructure costs.

The customer rates at Santee Cooper, by comparison to SCE&G and Duke, can keep the shareholder- owned utility rate payer within a reasonable range on the monthly bill. Otherwise, there would be a consumer revolt.

The nonprofit co- op, then, can reduce cost and pass the savings to the customer. The shareholder- owned utility monopoly can quietly reduce cost, and pass the enhanced profit margin to its shareholders while the PSC decides if the reduced cost and consequent gain in dividend yield justifies a rate reduction during the next rate case.

Somehow everyone involved has been happy for so long, producers and customers, no one advocates much change - until now.

Duke, the state's low- cost provider of shareholder- owned utility electric power, is the advocate for change. Duke charges S.C. homeowners $83.22 for 1,000 kilowatt- hours, while SCE&G has recently asked the PSC for permission to raise its rates from $117.48 per 1,000 kilowatt- hours to $118.90, which is almost 43 percent more than Duke's charge.

Charlotte- based Duke Energy is experimenting with an alternative economics tough to explain and even tougher to regulate. But the bottom line is a grand combination of reduction of use of electric power and expansion of company payout to its shareholders, both at the same time.

It's called Save- A- Watt.

Until recently, the shareholder- owned utility monopolies feigned interest in encouraging customer use reduction of electric power, such as Smart Cents and similar insults, all the while pushing for what every profitable company on the planet wants, more product demand from more customers.

Why, oh, why would an electric power supplier ever want to supply less electric power?

Duke's Save- A- Watt offers real economic incentive to reduce the use of electric power because the company can increase profits with increased product delivery and with decreased product delivery - both ways work towards profits. If not, the demand for electric power will never go down because the electric power company will never encourage it to go down.

As of early May, N.C. regulators approved temporary charges for Duke's Save-A- Watt concept in the state. As of early June, N.C. consumer and environmental advocates reached a settlement with Duke. The settlement still must be approved by state regulators.

The N.C. settlement calls for Save- A- Watt to reduce energy demand by 2 percent over the next four years. By 2020, the targeted reduction is 8 percent. The environmental groups argue the 2020 target reduces demand enough to nullify the call for the new controversial Cliffside coal plant, something comparable to nullifying the need for the Santee Cooper coal plant in Florence County, the plant cited for anticipated mercury poisoning in the waters of the Lowcountry.

Duke will base its shareholders' return on 50 percent of the avoided cost for conservation programs and 75 percent of the avoided cost for shifting electric power demand away from peak times.

For decades American farmers have been paid by the government not to plant certain crops, so why can't government regulators allow a return on electric power not produced?

The S.C. PSC rejected Duke's first proposal last February, but Duke plans to return with their N.C. settlement for presentation to the PSC later this summer.